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ABSTRACT  
Free-Space Optical (FSO) communication provides very large bandwidth, relatively low cost, low power, low mass of 
implementation, and improved security when compared to conventional Free-Space Radio-Frequency (FSRF) systems. In 
this paper, we demonstrate a communication protocol that demonstrates improved security and longer-range FSO 
communication, compared to existing FSO security techniques, such as N-slit interferometers. The protocol integrates 
chaotic communications with Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) techniques. A Lorenz chaotic system, which is inherently 
secure and auto-synchronized, is utilized for secure data communications over a classical channel, while QKD is used to 
exchange crucial chaotic system parameters over a secure quantum channel. We also provide a concept of operations for 
a NASA mission combining chaotic communications and QKD operating synergistically in an end-to-end space 
communications link. The experimental simulation results and analysis are favorable towards our approach. 
Keywords: Chaotic Communication, Quantum Key Distribution, FSO Security. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Free-Space Optical (FSO) communication provides very large bandwidth and relatively low cost, low power, and low mass 
of implementation when compared to conventional Free-Space Radio-Frequency (FSRF) systems1, 2, 3. Adding security to 
FSO communications has usually been proposed using laser N-slit interferometers where the laser signal takes the form of 
an interferometric pattern such that any attempt to intercept the signal causes the collapse of the interferometric pattern4, 5. 
This technique has been demonstrated to work over propagation distances of practical interest (several kilometers)6 for 
terrestrial applications and estimated to work over several thousand kilometers (2,000-10,000 km)7, 8 for space applications. 
Interferometric techniques, however, assume the availability of laser technology with minimal divergence of the 
interferometric signals. Such limitations result in relatively short communication range for deep-space communication. 
Therefore, security and long-range become a trade-off for FSO communications using interferometric techniques.  
In this paper, we propose a scheme which combines chaotic communications with quantum key distribution, in order to 
achieve more secure and synchronized FSO communication. Chaotic communication systems offer several features that 
make them suitable for secure communications. They display well defined but complex dynamic behaviors9 and 
characteristics such as broadband noise-like signals, unpredictability, and sensitivity to initial conditions9. These 
characteristics make it difficult for eavesdroppers to synchronize to the chaotic signal. Chaotic systems are unstable, 
nonlinear and aperiodic in nature, but they offer a wideband signal, which can be thought of as spread spectrum, with 
multi-path fading resistance10, 11. Additionally, chaotic systems are compatible with simpler formats/models such as On-
Off Keying (OOK) as well as M-ary pulse position modulation (PPM) schemes which are more compatible with deep 
space optical communications.  
Chaotic systems maintain synchronization by means of sharing a common set of parameters between transmitter and 
receiver. Before initiating chaotic data transmission, these synchronization parameters must be communicated with the 
receiver through a highly secure channel. In our scheme, we propose using Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) to share the 
chaotic synchronization parameters via a quantum channel. For secure key sharing, public-key cryptosystems generally 
use Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) algorithm12, which is based on the assumption that factorization of large integers is 
computationally impractical. However, with emergence of quantum computers13, 14, this assumption might not hold out to 
be true in the near future. Recent works15, 16 have demonstrated implementations of Shor’s algorithm17 to factorize large 
integers efficiently using a quantum computer. In the near future, a more powerful and accurate quantum computer would 
be able to break the RSA algorithm and compromise security of public-key systems. QKD, on the other hand, cannot be 
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compromised as any interception of the shared key destroys the data contained in it, thereby alerting the presence of an 
unintentional receiver. The unconditional security of QKD has been demonstrated in many previous works18, 19, 20.  
We propose to design transmitter and receiver models that are based on synchronous chaotic systems for use in FSO 
communications targeting both space and terrestrial applications. A key exchange model is integrated with the models for 
securely exchanging the chaotic synchronization parameters between the transmitter and receiver via a quantum and/or 
classical channel. A realistic classical channel with Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) is modeled for data 
communication. Low-density-parity-check (LDPC) and digital modulation/demodulation techniques such as Quadrature-
Phase-Shift-Keying (QPSK) are also implemented in the transmitter and receiver to minimize noise and improve bit-error-
rate (BER) of the transmitted information. For experimental analysis we send images encoded as binary non-return-to-zero 
(NRZ) data across the FSO channel and recover them at the receiver end. The proposed communications scheme can be 
used to secure optical communications downlink, which contains science data, as well as securing optical communications 
uplink, which may contain spacecraft and instrument commands. Thus, future FSO space communications utilizing the 
outcome of the proposed work will allow for secure communications at distances from Mars to the outer planets and Kuiper 
belt (1.5 to 40 AU). Missions such as the Ice Giants Decadal Survey mission21 would benefit from this technology. 
The rest of the paper is organized such that Section 2 presents background information and related work. Section 3 
describes the proposed communication scheme in detail. In Section 4 we provide a concept of operations for a practical 
NASA mission. The experimental work and analysis is presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 ends the paper with 
conclusions and future work. 
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
Chaotic Communications  
Our approach leverages previous work and concepts that were introduced particularly for chaotic synchronization and 
communication10, 22, 23, 24. Generally, in conventional communication systems, a periodic carrier introduced in the 
transmitter carries the modulating data message (AM, FM, ASK, FSK, etc.), where the receiver recovers the message by 
means of tuning to this carrier frequency. Chaotic communications schemes generalize this principle by utilizing a chaotic 
carrier, which, similarly to a spread-spectrum approach, offers a broad frequency spectrum used in carrying the data signal 
from the transmitter. For successful transmission recovery in chaotic systems, synchronization between the transmitter and 
receiver is essential. The control and synchronization of chaotic systems have been studied over the past two decades22, 23, 
24 for potential applications in secure communication10. The fundamental aperiodic nature of the chaotic carrier signal does 
not allow it to be stored in the receiver as a reference signal, which is detrimental for coherent detection of the transmitted 
signal. Pecora and Carroll in 1990 reported that certain chaotic systems possess a self-synchronization property22. They 
proved that a chaotic system is self-synchronizing if it can be decomposed into stable response subsystems. The stable 
response subsystems when driven by a common signal from the original (drive) system can then operate in auto synchrony 
with the drive system22, 23, 24. For example, they showed that the Lorenz chaotic system9, usually called Lorenz attractor, is 
decomposable into two separate stable response subsystems that will each synchronize to the drive system when started 
from any initial condition25, 26, as shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Lorenz attractor and its decomposable stable response subsystems for use in communications. 
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Cuomo and Oppenheim25, 26, based on Pecora and Carroll’s findings22, 23, 24, proposed chaos synchronization as a means 
for communication. In one of their discussed approaches, chaotic signal masking, the noise-like chaotic signal, x(t) 
generated at the transmitter is added to the input data signal, d(t), and then transmitted over the communication channel. 
For signal masking, it is assumed that the power level of the input data signal is significantly lower than that of x(t). For 
this technique, regenerating the chaotic carrier at the receiver end25, 26, is essential for synchronization. The error between 
the received signal and the regenerated carrier, could then be used for recovering the original data signal, d(t). 
Quantum Key Distribution 
Compared to conventional cryptography systems, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a far more secure scheme18, 19, 20 as 
the information integrity is dependent on properties of quantum mechanics, rather than on computational difficulty of the 
cryptographic algorithm. It works by enabling two participants to share a secret key securely and without any information 
divulged to any eavesdropper. Once the key is shared and known to both parties, the transmitting side can start encrypting 
messages with the shared key and broadcasting them, while the receiving party decrypts the message with the key known 
only to them. The distinguishing and critical property of QKD is that the key is encoded as conjugate bases of a quantum 
state (or qubits) and transmitted over a quantum channel19. According to fundamentals of quantum mechanics, it is 
impossible to measure a quantum state simultaneously in two orthonormal basis19. Thus any attempt to intercept the 
quantum channel and measure a qubit destroys its quantum state and a random outcome is observed by the interceptor. 
The destroyed qubit also indicates to the receiver that an interception was attempted. These characteristics make QKD a 
highly secure scheme for sharing key information. 
The first secure QKD protocol27 was introduced by Bennet and Brassard in 1984 and named BB84 after them. Photon 
polarization states were used to transmit key information through a quantum channel in combination with an insecure 
public channel. The key information is encoded as non-orthogonal quantum states, which are polarization directions of 0, 
45, 90 and 135 degrees in the case of photons. An example of how the protocol works is discussed as follows. The 
transmitter ‘Alice’ encodes each bit on one of two polarization bases (Rectilinear R, or Diagonal D) and uses either pair 
of polarization states/directions (0, 90) or (45, 135) to encode each bit. The receiver ‘Bob’ can use either one of the two 
polarization bases to measure the received photon and recover the bit, hence Bob has a 50% chance to recover the correct 
bits. After all photons are measured by Bob, both Alice and Bob communicate over a public channel, with Alice sending 
the basis of each photon she had sent and Bob sending the basis of all of his measurements. They eliminate the measurement 
bits whose basis did not match and create a key with the remaining number of bits. To detect the presence of an 
eavesdropper, Bob and Alice can agree upon a pre-shared subset of the key bits, e.g., one third, and match that with their 
measured bits. If no errors are detected then they commence encryption of their data with the shared key and can securely 
transmit over the classical channel. Figure 2 illustrates the above BB84 protocol example. 
 
Figure 2: BB84 protocol using two non-orthogonal bases and four polarization directions. 
Related Work 
More work on chaotic communication28, 29, 30, 31 have been reported since its introduction by Cuomo and Oppenheim25, 26. 
Despite the potential use of chaos in secure communications, there are known limitations when applied in a real system. 
The major problem in designing chaos-based secure communication systems can be stated as how to send an encrypted 
message from the transmitter (drive system) to the receiver (response system) over a public channel while achieving 
security, maintaining privacy, and providing good noise rejection31. Specifically, small parameter mismatches and noise 
may bring about irreversible synchronization errors due to large distortions present in the synchronization manifold, known 
as attractor bubbling32. Moreover, bit-error-ratio (BER) of the synchronized chaos communication may be higher than 
alternative secure communication approaches. This is because chaotic systems continuously generate non-redundant 
information and have a positive Kolmogorov-Sinai entropy31. Overcoming these limitations should be achieved, in 
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practice, using either analog or digital hardware31 in a robust form that can achieve, to some degree, perfect reconstruction 
of the transmitted signal at the receiver end. Several attempts were made to robustify the design of chaos-based secure 
communication systems and many techniques were developed28, 31. Similar research work investigating the combination 
of chaotic systems with FSO communication has been demonstrated33. For example, Annovazzi-Lodi et al.33 proposed an 
optical configuration of semiconductor lasers which are injected with a third driving signal to gain chaotic synchronization. 
This methodology and hardware setup has some limitations that were avoided in our proposed work. In their work, the 
lasers were configured based on the Lang Kobayashi model34 which is not inherently auto-synchronizable, and hence the 
need for external injection from a third laser. The external laser used optical reflectors to create the synchronizing signal 
which is impractical or infeasible in a long-distance communication system. Our proposed work based on the auto-
synchronizing Lorenz model eliminates the need for such an extra costly hardware. 
There have been several notable demonstrations of QKD in FSO communications. Marcikic et al.35 demonstrate a QKD 
system utilizing polarization entangled photon pairs. Schmitt-Manderbach et al.36 present an experimental evaluation of 
the BB84 protocol over a 144 km FSO link using weak coherent lasers. Hughes et al.37 demonstrate a similar 
implementation of BB84 over a 10 km FSO channel in both day and nighttime. These implementation efforts of the BB84 
protocol, however, do not offer any improved security for longer-range FSO terrestrial communication. In our work, we 
present a highly secure communication scheme that provides improved and auto-synchronized FSO chaotic 
communications by combining QKD with chaotic systems. We also provide a practical concept of operations for an FSO 
mission where the proposed scheme can be applied. While QKD is used to secure key distribution, additional security is 
provided by the chaotic Lorenz models in the classical communication channel to protect the data from intruding attacks. 
The use of chaotic signal masking in data transmission also eliminates the cost of employing computationally intensive 
encryption/decryption techniques and reduces hardware complexity and cost.  To the best of our knowledge, this work is 
the first effort to use chaotic communication techniques integrated with QKD for securing digital FSO communications.  
3. PROPOSED CHAOTIC COMMUNICATION WITH QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION  
Figure 3 shows our proposed system for chaotic communications with QKD. The flow of operations is as follows. On the 
transmitter (TX) side, the QKD TX model starts its operation by exchanging the chaotic synchronization parameters with 
the receiver module (RX), in a two-way BB84-like protocol via both classical and quantum channels. On the receiver side, 
see Figure 3, the QKD RX model recovers the chaotic parameters and provides them to the synchronizable Lorenz chaotic 
receiver. Once parameter exchange is complete, data transmission is started from the transmitter side. The input message 
data dt is converted to a binary non-return-to-zero (NRZ) format mt. The Lorenz transmitter, generates the noise-like chaotic 
signal xt which is added with the message data to form the transmission signal St which is then converted to pure binary 
format Bt consisting of 1s and 0s. The binary data, which constitutes the chaotically masked message, is given to a Low-
density-parity-check (LDPC) module which performs forward error correction by adding redundancy to the data. The 
encoded signal Ct undergoes Quadrature-Phase-Shift-Keying (QPSK) digital modulation before being broadcast on the 
Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) communication channel in complex form Qt. On the receiver side, see Figure 3, 
the received complex signal undergoes QPSK demodulation, LDPC decoding and binary to real conversion. The converted 
signal Sr is given as the driving signal to the Lorenz receiver, which already has the synchronization parameters from the 
QKD RX model, and is able to regenerate a chaotic signal xr similar to the one at the Lorenz TX. This regenerated signal 
is used for recovering the message data mr. The recovered message, which is an NRZ data, is converted to its original 
format by an NRZ decoder. In the next sections, the operations of the Lorenz TX, RX and the QKD parameter exchange 
models are discussed in detail. 
 
Figure 3: Transmitter and receiver modules for chaotic communication scheme with QKD. 
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3.1 Chaotic Transmitter and Receiver 
In designing Lorenz attractor for both the transmitter and the receiver, we leverage Cuomo and Oppenheim’s work25, 26. 
As it can be seen in Figure 3, the input data signal dt(t) is masked with the generated chaotic state signals xt(t) to obtain the 
transmitted signal St(t) = xt(t) + dt(t). At the receiver end, the chaotic carrier25, 26 xr(t) is regenerated using the received 
signal Sr(t) and the same system parameters of the transmitter, σ, ρ, β, and initial conditions x(0), y(0) and z(0), which are 
essential for synchronization. The error signal mr(t) which is the difference between the received signal Sr(t) and the 
regenerated carrier xr(t) is then used for reconstructing the original data dr(t), see Figure 3. In designing the simulation 
models for the transmitter and the receiver, we discretized the differential equations (1) and (2) using Euler, 1st order 
Runge–Kutta (RK), approximation. Higher order RK were also used but with insignificant improvement in accuracy, hence 
1st order RK approximation was chosen for its simpler implementation and lower hardware cost.   
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We also implemented signal masking of the data signal with the chaotic carrier signal as simply St(t) = dt(t) + xt(t). Figure 
4, illustrates the digital models derived from RK approximation of (1) and (2). For modeling, we discretize the time domain 
as t = n.∆t = n.h, where n is the discrete time (sample) index, and h is the sample time step or the reciprocal of the sampling 
frequency fsampling. 
  
 
Figure 4: Chaotic transmitter and receiver models in the proposed communication scheme. 
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3.2 Quantum Key Distribution model for chaotic parameter exchange 
The QKD model is responsible for establishing the FSO chaotic communications link with exchange of the set of 
synchronization parameters, ℤ where 
    ℤ = {𝜎𝜎,𝜌𝜌,𝛽𝛽, 𝑥𝑥(0),𝑦𝑦(0), 𝑧𝑧(0)}      (3) 
 
The synchronization parameters are signed real numbers. A transmitter (Alice) and receiver (Bob) will exchange the 
parameters using quantum communications mapped from the signed real numbers.  Given 
 
             𝜓𝜓 = 𝑝𝑝0|0⟩ + 𝑝𝑝1|1⟩       (4) 
 
such that the binary representation of ℤ can be mapped to either basis/symbol state where, 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  represents the probability of 
each symbol, and 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖  is the basis set with a total probability p given by: 
 
                                                                                   p =� pi
i
= 1                                                                                      (5) 
and probability density function ρ’ given by                                                                                         𝜌𝜌′ =� pi|ψi�
i
�ψi|                                                                                            (6) 
 
Alice and Bob utilize a quantum communications model that is agnostic to the quantum basis and mode of quantum 
communication. The quantum codebook is created from a user specified basis set 𝜓𝜓. The user can specify pure states, 
mixed states or a combination of pure and mixed states.  The basis set operates upon a positive semi-definite matrix created 
from the user-provided chaotic parameters. For the minimum basis set, the set of synchronization parameters are 
transformed into a set of matrices 𝐴𝐴 = {𝐴𝐴0,𝐴𝐴1,𝐴𝐴2} such that 
𝐴𝐴0 = �𝜎𝜎 00 𝜌𝜌 � ,  𝐴𝐴1 = �𝛽𝛽 00 𝑥𝑥(0)� ,𝐴𝐴2 = �𝑦𝑦(0) 00 𝑧𝑧(0)� 
 
Alice and Bob will use the RSA algorithm to generate a key pair of a private key and a shared public key, details of the 
function of the RSA algorithm can be found here12. Alice and Bob possess a public encryption key {e, n} and a private 
decryption key {d, n} with a common factor n. For any integer message M, where M < n and M is an integer representation 
of each non-zero entry in matrix set A, Alice generates encrypted message C using the public key {e, n} as described in 
(7) and Bob decrypts C back to M using the private key {d, n} as described in (8).                                                                                          𝐶𝐶 = 𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒 ∗ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝑛𝑛)                                                                                        (7) 
                                                                                         𝑀𝑀 = 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 ∗ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝑛𝑛)                                                                                        (8) 
   
Pre-shared secrets between Alice and Bob 
Alice and Bob have pre-established RSA key pairs, {e, n} and {d, n}, as well as a protocol for establishing new pairs. Alice 
and Bob share the knowledge of the quantum basis. Presumably, Alice and Bob are using identical hardware and software 
for the coding and decoding of qubits. The physical implementation that Alice and Bob are using drives the quantum 
coding basis. The lowest level of security is afforded with the simplest basis selection. The higher the order of quantum 
basis, the less effective brute force eavesdropping or sequence analysis will become. Let Alice and Bob share a set of secret 
symbol probabilities S, as given in (9), for building a second codebook. Derived from this set of probabilities, the second 
codebook is a binary Huffman dictionary of variable length codewords H as defined in (10).                                                                                            𝑆𝑆 = {𝑠𝑠0, 𝑠𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛}                                                                                          (9) 
                                                                                      𝐻𝐻 = {𝑊𝑊0,𝑊𝑊1, … ,𝑊𝑊𝑛𝑛}                                                                                       (10) 
 
 
 
 
The number of bits in each word W, is determined by the probabilities in S. Combinations of 𝑊𝑊 are formed to develop the 
encryption protocol as shown in Figure 5. 
 
Huffman codewords 
In the simplest implementation, only two Qubit codeword possibilities exist. Consequently, a brute force attack on the 
quantum exchanges will lead to approximately 50% of the qubits being correctly identified by Eve. Furthermore, Eve can 
apply sequence analysis and determine that there are only two quantum codewords, and determine the frequency of 
appearance of each codeword. Alice, however, has coded the classical bits into another codeword dictionary and selection 
of the codewords from that dictionary is determined by encrypted matches of the qubit exchange, see Figure 5. Therefore, 
a limiting factor in a successful Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) impersonation attack is codeword recovery. This approach 
has the following advantages: 
1) The synchronization parameters are exchanged twice. The first exchange helps establish the quantum keys and 
the second exchange sends the encrypted parameters as quantum bits. 
2) Eve, reading the first transmission of qubits has no more idea than Bob on how to interpret the qubits. Unless Eve 
can fully impersonate Bob, the forward information from Alice is meaningless. 
3) Alice and Bob can compare the two exchanges of qubits for information about the quality of the quantum link 
and the potential existence of an eavesdropper. 
 
Figure 5. Use of pre-shared secret codebook for encrypting/decrypting the synchronization data. The position of the codewords is 
assumed to have been randomized by Alice and de-randomized by Bob. 
 
Assuming a 24-bit sequence within Alice’s synchronization parameters denoted as X, we have previously established the 
generation of M from the Alice-Bob matches of the qubit basis. We have also established how Alice uses the RSA algorithm 
on M to generate the Key. The Key holds the encrypted positions of the matches represented by M. Alice and Bob have 
previously used the pre-shared symbol probabilities S, to generate the Huffman dictionary H, as shown in Figure 5. In this 
example, the 24-bit sequence X is decomposed into three 8-bit words. Therefore, the valid combinations of codewords are 
concatenated codewords of length 8-bits, and the XOR encryption operation is performed on 8-bit words. In this example, 
the valid symbols are: {𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏, 𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚, 𝑒𝑒, 𝑓𝑓, 𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧} and the valid codeword combinations are: {𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐, 𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎, 𝑥𝑥𝑧𝑧, 𝑦𝑦𝑏𝑏, 𝑧𝑧𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐, 𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦,𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏𝑦𝑦, 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥}. Given m valid codewords in H, Alice and Bob use Key mod m to select the 8-
bit codewords for the XOR encryption operation. 
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Alice and Bob are free to setup this approach with as many codewords as necessary in H, and establish the Hamming 
distance between each code. Alice and Bob determine the length of X and its decomposition into words of arbitrary length 
as desired, not necessarily 8-bits in length. 
Parameter exchange protocol 
The proposed protocol for chaotic synchronization parameter exchange along with the corresponding Tx/Rx models are 
shown in Figure 6. In step 1, Alice encodes the synchronization parameters into classical binary format, translates to qubits, 
and then transmits them to Bob using the agreed upon basis. Bob has the basis with no knowledge of the order of qubit 
coding. Bob randomly measures the qubits and transmits the results back to Alice. In step 2, Alice receives and compares 
Bob’s results, encrypts the matches (M) to form the quantum encryption key (Key), see Figures 5 and 6. In step 3, Alice 
sends the Key to Bob. In step 4, Alice encrypts the synchronization parameters using the Key and the pre-shared Huffman 
dictionary codewords (H) described in (10), translates, and transmits the associated qubits to Bob. Bob then decodes the 
qubits using his pre-shared Huffman dictionary and the Key. The detailed operation of step 4 was shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 6: Quantum Key Distribution models for chaotic parameter exchange. 
4. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR NASA MISSION 
Figure 7 depicts an orbital configuration in which AliceSat and BobSat intend to exchange data via a space-to-space optical 
communications link using the proposed chaotic communication scheme with QKD parameter exchange. At approximately 
earth-lunar distances of about 400,000 km, 10 cm optics at 1550 nm transmit wavelength (similar to the Lunar Laser 
Communications Demonstration - LLCD38), the beamwidth is approximately 6 km diameter at that distance. Therefore, 
the eavesdropper, EveSat, will attempt to be within that area to have a line-of-sight (LOS) with good link characteristics 
for impersonating BobSat as shown in Figure 7. As a point of comparison, the GRACE spacecraft tandem which performed 
earth gravity mapping, flew 220 km apart from each other39. 
 
Figure 7. AliceSat, BobSat, and EveSat orbital configuration with the AliceSat transmitting beam in the direction of BobSat. It is 
assumed that AliceSat and BobSat are boresight aligned. EveSat is within the AliceSat transmit beam but undetected by AliceSat, 
BobSat, or Earth Optical Ground Stations. 
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Given that this is a space application, the most likely attacks are blinding attacks in which EveSat attempts to disable 
AliceSat and BobSat, and Impersonation attacks such as Man-In-the-Middle (MITM) attacks. Blinding attacks are beyond 
the scope of this paper while are focus is towards MITM attacks. Specifically, the goal of EveSat’s MITM attack is to 
intercept and decode the data being exchanged between AliceSat and BobSat without being identified. 
Pre-launch security requirements 
AliceSat and BobSat must have establish their sets of pre-shared secrets and a strong authentication protocol to minimize 
the probability of the MITM attack success. AliceSat and BobSat are using RSA encryption, therefore they will establish 
their private and public keys as previously described. AliceSat and BobSat also share a classical Huffman dictionary of 
binary codewords. These codewords will map to encrypted key parameters.  
Depending upon the space-to-space orbital drivers (two free-flying independent spacecraft, orbiter-to-relay, etc.), AliceSat 
and BobSat will establish a series of authentication and key exchange procedures. Once authenticated, AliceSat and BobSat 
can utilize the quantum communications channel for all forms of data exchange. AliceSat and BobSat can use the initial 
quantum key exchange protocol for re-keying. 
Strength of the link security 
A number of factors contribute to the link security: 
1) Required proximity of EveSat to either BobSat or AliceSat. 
2) The nature of the known orbital dynamics between BobSat and AliceSat. 
3) The inherent spread spectrum nature of chaotic communications. 
4) The quantum coding of the synchronization parameters, to address the weak link of sending the synchronization 
parameters as cleartext. 
5) The RSA encryption of the key parameters reconciling the correct matches of BobSat and AliceSat quantum basis. 
On a two-qubit scheme that is applicable to BB84-like key distribution, security is enhanced through maximizing 
randomization of the inputs40. Security can also be improved by increasing the orders of complexity of the quantum basis, 
provided that the eavesdropper cannot use knowledge of one state to derive knowledge of the remaining states40. This is at 
the cost of additional hardware and software complexity. EveSat can mount a sophisticated attack on the basic binary 
coding schemes, and analyze the distribution of measurement responses when she applies her quantum basis. The 
countermeasure is to increase the modularity of quantum basis and the complexity of the encryption protocols within the 
constraints of the budget and schedule. However, the basic security scheme shown in this paper, combined with the 
constraints on the eavesdropper to attack this space-to-space free space optical link would be useful if installed in a NIST-
moderate security environment and easily extensible to NIST-high security environment41. 
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The performance of the proposed communication scheme is evaluated through our experimental work described in this 
section. Accuracy of quantum key and chaotic parameter exchange was tested where real-time data transmission and 
recovery across an AWGN channel model was carried out using images as the test input data. The noise tolerance of the 
system was investigated by measuring the transmission bit error rate (BER) for varying values of channel SNR. The quality 
of the reconstructed image was also evaluated by measuring the percentage error in pixels between the original and the 
reconstructed image. MATLAB version 2017A was used for design and simulation purposes.  
 
Image Transmission 
The system was tested for image transmission using different sets of chaotic parameters. Table 1 shows two sets of chaotic 
synchronization parameters that are typically used for chaotic systems. The experimental results showed that the QKD 
model was able to exchange the chaotic parameters with 100% accuracy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Two sets of Lorenz chaotic parameters. 
Config. Sigma Rho Beta X(0) Y(0) Z(0) Parameters successfully recovered at receiver 
A 16.0 64.0 4.0 1.0 0 0 Yes 
B 10.0 28.0 2.677 1.77 2.89 4.56 Yes 
 
With the Lorenz TX and RX configured with different sets of parameters, the attractors generated different forms of 
random, noise-like chaotic signal. This is demonstrated in Figure 8 for each of the configurations in Table 1. A sampling 
frequency of 2 KHz was used by the Lorenz TX and RX. 
  
Configuration A Configuration B 
Figure 8: Chaotic signals generated by synchronized Lorenz Attractor TX and RX for different configurations. 
 
With a fixed configuration, the channel noise was varied from SNR range of 0 dB to 40 dB to evaluate the noise tolerance 
of the system. The BER as a function of SNR obtained from these experiments is shown in Figure 9. The experimental 
results show that the system can reject channel noise for a wide range of SNR (> 0.8 dB). Accurate recovery of the data 
was possible even for very low SNR, e.g., 0.1 dB.  
 
Figure 9: Bit Error Rate (BER) as a function of Signal-to-Noise-Ratio (SNR). 
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An image transmitted by AliceSat and reconstructed at BobSat for SNR 0.1 dB is shown in Figure 10. Results show a 0% 
error in pixels between the original and reconstructed image. Also shown is a third image reconstructed by an unintentional 
intercepting RX, EveSat. We assume that EveSat has knowledge of the communication scheme we are using and is able 
to perform techniques such as LDPC decoding, QPSK demodulation, NRZ decoding, etc. to reconstruct the image data. 
However, to successfully intercept any data from this scheme EveSat has to know the chaotic parameters shared by 
AliceSat and BobSat, and due to the high security provided by QKD, EveSat has no way of acquiring those parameters. 
Thus, EveSat proceeds with a randomly configured/synchronized Lorenz RX to try and capture the transmitted signal and 
regenerate the message. Results prove that EveSat cannot obtain synchronization parameters from the quantum channel 
and synchronize with the chaotic transmitter, thus it cannot obtain any useful data from the intercepted signal. 
Synchronization Parameters 
σ = 16, ρ = 64, β = 4, x(0) = 1, y(0) = 0, and z(0) = 0 
 
10-a) Original image transmitted by Alice. 
 
Synchronization Parameters 
σ = 16, ρ = 64, β = 4, x(0) = 1, y(0) = 0, and z(0) = 0 
SNR = 0.1 dB, Pixel Error = 0 % 
 
10-b) Reconstructed image by Bob using recovered synchronization parameters. 
 
Synchronization Parameters 
σ = 10, ρ = 45.6, β = 14, x(0) = 0, y(0) = 0, and z(0) = 0 
SNR = 0.1 dB, Pixel Error = 98.3084 % 
 
10-c) Reconstructed image by Eve using incorrect synchronization parameters. 
 
Figure 10: Results of image transmission between Alice and Bob, with interception by Eve. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we demonstrated a secure and synchronizable scheme for free-space optical (FSO) communication by 
combining chaotic communication using Lorenz attractor and quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol. The scheme is 
evaluated by simulation results, which show that the system is noise tolerant and feasible for FSO communications. The 
results also show that the scheme is secured by the use of chaotic signals, which are highly random/unpredictable due to 
their high sensitivity to the system parameters and initial conditions. Results also show that secure sharing of chaotic 
 
 
 
 
parameters between the transmitter and the receiver via QKD is feasible and increases efficiency and security of this 
scheme. Future work will include hardware implementations and interfacing with free-space optics.  
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